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In this article the authors examine the difficulties encountered by
modern hardrock mineral explorers in locating and maintaining unpatented mining claims on the public domain, under the General Mining
Law of 1872. The authors point out the tension 'between the requirements of the General Mining Law, on the one hand, and the economic
and technological realities of hardrock mineral exploration, on the
other. The article outlines practical solutions within the framework of
court decisions construing the General Mining Law.
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This article addresses some of the practical problems
which face the mineral locator on the public domain attempting to cope with circumstances which have changed radically
since the enactment of the General Mining Law of 1872
under which he operates. In addition to "public interest"
challenges and governmental resistance, today's prospectors
and miners must also live with a law which clearly did not
contemplate modern exploration and mining technology.
Difficulties are compounded for those attempting to acquire
and maintain a large group or block of mining claims.
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Our topic is limited to those minerals which are presently locatable under the General Mining Law of 1872, and
the discussion assumes that actual on-the-ground activity
is preceded by land status work which has confirmed that
the ground to be claimed or acquired is actually open to
location under the General Mining Law. Once this preliminary but critical determination is made, the locator
must try to satisfy existing state and federal laws so he
can give third parties both actual and constructive notice
of his claims. During this process he must correctly identify
the type of deposit he claims and make a sufficient "discovery" of valuable minerals within each claim in order to
perfect his rights. In the first instance, a discovery is needed
to entitle his claim to the ground to prevail over the claim
of a subsequent locator, but ultimately a discovery is needed
to make his claim good as against the paramount title of
the United States and to entitle him to a mineral patent to
the ground.
During the entire period of time before he finally is
entitled to receive a mineral patent, the locator must vigilantly maintain his claim of ownership. Before discovery he
might be able to rely on the limited protection afforded by
the judicially created doctrine of pedis possessio when the
adverse party is a rival claimant. After discovery he can rely
on the performance of assessment work to maintain his
claim, but, if more than a single claim was located, questions
about "group" assessment work and the extent to which
certain work actually benefits the claims are certain to
arise.
LOCATION PROBLEMS

The prospector fortunate enough to have made discoveries is at least in a position to evaluate his alternatives.
Long before the discoveries are made, however, initial decisions are required in order to launch the exploration program. Once a target area is identified, claims must be located
to give others notice of the prospector's intentions.
Lodes v. Placers
The General Mining Law classifies locatable mineral
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deposits into two categories, lode and placer, and creates
distinct methods for the appropriation of each. 1 A locator
must first determine which classification applies to his
target and then comply with the statutory requirements
applicable to that category of deposit. The size of permissible
locations and the location procedures (and ultimately the
purchase price) differ depending upon whether the target
is a lode or placer deposit.2 Other rights also vary according
to the nature of the deposit: only lode claims have extralateral rights; and (subject to extralateral rights of other
claimants) a valid placer location, unlike a valid lode location, does not necessarily appropriate all locatable minerals
discovered within the limits of the claim.3 More importantly,
since the General Mining Law defines as placer everything
which is not a lode, the locator must choose between the
classifications at his peril.4
Lode deposits, as "defined" in the General Mining Law,
occur in veins, lodes, or ledges; placer deposits are all deposits which do not occur in veins, lodes, or ledges. Generally,
a placer is characterized as loose unconsolidated materials
or particles which have migrated from their source or place
of origin to the place where they are found. Lodes generally
refer to mineral deposits which are found "in place", i.e., in
the place of their source or origin. It is important to remember that the statutes defining lodes and placers were
not drafted by geologists or scientists; they were based, as
much as anything, on tradition and custom of the miners
in the 1860's and 1870's.' Moreover, it is increasingly
1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 23 and 25 (1976).
2. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 5.9A-5.26A (1980) for a thorough discussion of these differences.
3.

Compare 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (lode claims) with 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1976)
(placer claims) ; see also the discussion of "Lodes In Placers," infra at

note 18.
4.

Discovery of a lode will not support a placer location, and vice versa. Cole
v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920). Under certain circumstances, however, a
good faith mistake in choosing the form of location may not be fatal when
contested by a rival junior locator, rather than the federal government.
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.23 (1960 ed.), and Sherwood and
Greer, Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example, 3 LAND AND
WATER LAW REVIEW 1, 14-15 (1968).

5. The most often cited definition of a lode deposit is found in Eureka Consol.
Mining Co. v. Richmond Mining Co., 4 Sawy. 302, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 578,
8 Fed. Cas. 319 (No. 4548) (C.C.D. Nev. 1877), af 'd, 103 U.S. 839 (1881).
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obvious that today's commercial mineral deposits occur in
infinite varieties, and not just in the simple forms contemplated by the General Mining Law.
Other commentators have identified the following six
criteria which the courts apply with varying degrees of
emphasis when attempting to make the lode-versus-placer
distinction: (1) Whether the area is generally considered by
miners to be lode territory or placer territory; (2) Whether
conventional lode or placer mining methods are well-adapted
to extracting the minerals involved; (3) The character of
the surrounding country rock; (4) The character or substance of the mineral body; (5) The existence of a reasonable
definition or boundary between the mineralized zone and
the surrounding country rock; and (6) The size of the
mineralized body and the depth at which it is found.'
These criteria have been examined at length elsewhere,7
and it would serve no purpose here to reiterate that discussion. Nevertheless, some of these criteria remain difficult to apply in cases involving blocks of mining claims
covering large, low-grade mineral deposits.
One potential problem concerns the so-called "deep
placer" deposit, a term that refers to subterranean channels
of ancient streams within which beds of auriferous gravels
have been deposited s California courts have taken the view
that such deposits are placers, reasoning that a lode does
not include a bed of gravel in a channel of an ancient stream
from which gold might be extracted by washing, even though
the ancient stream bed might now be buried.' Nevada courts,
however have held such a deposit- to be "in place".1" Early
decisions of the Land Department agreed With the California
placer classification.11 Lindley, however, criticized this determination since discovery requirements for placer locations
6.
7.

Sherwood and Greer, supra note 4, at 32.
Sherwood and .Greer, supra note 4; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.9A
(1980) . See also Twitty, Amendments to the Mining Laws, 8 ARIZ. L. REV.
63 (1966) and Hill, Placer Mining Claims-Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 385 (1977).
8. 2 LINDLEY ON MINES"§ 427 (3d Ed. 1914).
.9. Gregory v. Pershbaker, 73 Cal. 109, 14 P. 401 (1887).
10. Jones v. Prospect Mountain Tunnel Co., 21-Nev. 339, 31 P. 642 (1892).
11. 2 LINDLEY -ON MINES § 427. (3d Ed. .19-14). .
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are not compatible with the classification as placers of mineral deposits in which discovery may only be accomplished
by drilling from the surface or drifting in a channel.12
The size of the mineralized body and the depth at which
it is found is today a particularly troublesome criterion.
Generally, the deeper the ore body, the more likely it is to
be classified as a lode. Size of the deposit, however, may
compel a different result. For example, the extensive size
of a gypsum deposit covering five square miles was an
important criterion in holding that the deposit should be
classified as a placer.13 In another case, where the exterior
boundaries of the area contested by lode and placer claimants
covered almost ten square miles, the size of the mineralized
zone was an important factor in classifying that deposit
as a placer. 4 On the other hand, ten contiguous claims
covering a horizontal sandstone bed in which uranium was
found were properly located as lode claims, even though
the deposit was alleged by the placer claimant to be formless
and without definite boundaries.15
In the two cases above in which placer locations were
determined to be proper because of the large size of the ore
deposit, the courts also relied heavily upon the discontinuity
of mineralization within the purported lodes. It did not
appear that a continuous body of ore existed or that the
deposits were sufficiently distinguishable from surrounding
country rock to justify lode locations. Another factor of
some importance was that senior locators prevailed in both
cases upon the basis of reasonable, good faith determinations
concerning the deposits in question.
Of course, it is possible to make both placer and lode
locations in an attempt to be absolutely safe in doubtful
cases, but such equivocation can generate needless expense
and cause its own complications.1" Because of these compli12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Pepperdine v. Keyes, 198 Cal. App. 2d 25, 17 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1961).
Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan, 272 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1959).
Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957), discussed
extensively in Sherwood and Greer, supra note 4, at 16-31.
16. The sequence of locating overlapping placer and lode locations is critical:
the placers must be located first. See Hill, supra note 7, at 395-96, and the
discussion of "Lodes in Placers," infra at note 18.
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cations, one commentator suggests it would seem best to
revise the statutory scheme to provide for a single type of
location for locatable minerals.' Until such statutory revision is enacted, however, the strongest showing to support
the validity of a lode location can be made upon a record
which reads as follows: The target area, and areas not too
dissimiliar, are generally considered by miners as lode territory; placer methods are not well adapted to extracting the
mineral because of the depth of the ore body and the hardness of surrounding rock; the surrounding rock firmly embraces the mineral-bearing rock; the mineral-bearing rock
has length, width, depth, is capable of measurement, and
occupies a defined space; the zone of contact between the
mineral-bearing rock and country rock is reasonably defined; and the size of the ore body is not so great as to cast
doubt upon its continuity or its identity as distinct from
surrounding country rock.
Lodes in Placers
As discussed above, the rights which attach to valid
lode and placer locations are different. Consequently, lode
claims may be located within placer claims under certain
circumstances.'"
The provision of the General Mining Law which permits known lodes to be located within placer claims has no
application to valid lode claims located prior to placer locations. The ground embraced by a valid lode location is not

subject to contrary disposition by the United States. 9 Lode
17. See Twitty, supra note 7, at 82.
18. See 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1976), which states: "Where the same person, association, or corporation is in possession of a placer claim, and also a vein or
lode included within the boundaries thereof, application shall be made for
a patent for the placer claim, with the statement that it includes such vein
or lode, and in such case a patent shall issue for the placer claim . . . including such vein or lode, upon the payment of $5 per acre for such vein
or lode claim, and 25 feet of surface on each side thereof . . . [a] nd where
a vein or lode, such as is described in Section 23 of this title, is known to
exist within the boundaries of a placer claim, an application for a patent
for such placer claim which does not include an application for the vein or
lode claim shall be construed as a conclusive declaration that the claimant
of the placer claim has no right of possession of the vein or lode claim;
but where the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known, a
patent for the placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral and other
deposits within the boundaries thereof."
19. Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U.S. 348, 351-53 (1888).
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locators are granted, in 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), the right
of exclusive possession and enjoyment of all the surface
included within the boundaries of their locations. No subsequent locator, whether the discoverer of a lode or placer claim,
may invade that surface area except to mark boundaries
so as to define extralateral rights.
Surface rights acquired by a placer location, however,
are subject to different rules. If a lode is "known to exist"
within a placer location, the "known" lode may be located
either before or after the placer claim is located. If a valid
lode location antedates a placer location which embraces the
same ground, the lode location effectively appropriates the
ground and the subsequent placer locator acquires no rights
therein. If, however, the lode is located subsequent to a valid
placer location, 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1976) governs the rights
of the competing locators. Under this statute, a senior perfected placer location does not confer rights to the possession
of lodes found to exist within that claim at any time prior
to the filing of an application for the placer patent. A placer
location does not effectively appropriate all the ground
located because the placer claimant obtains no title to
known lodes within his placer location simply by virtue of
a placer appropriation."0 Any lode known to exist within
a placer location prior to the date the placer patent is
applied for must be separately claimed. Only the discoverer
of a lode may make any claim thereto, but such lodes may be
appropriated by either the placer claimant or by others. If
not claimed by the placer claimant, title to a lode "known
to exist" will not pass by virtue of a placer patent since
known lodes within placers remain the property of the
United States, subject to disposition under the mining laws.
Therefore, when it is necessary to locate both placer and
lode claims in doubtful cases, it is imperative that the
placers be located first; otherwise the senior lode claims
may be deemed abandoned."'
If a vein or lode has been properly located and its
20. 2 LINDLEY ON MINES § 413 (3d Ed. 1914).
21. Hill, 8spra note 7, at 395-96.
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boundaries specifically marked on the surface so as to be
readily traced and notice of the location is properly recorded,
that lode is "known to exist" under 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1976).
Such location must, however, be predicated on a discovery
of rock in place containing valuable mineral depositsY'
Knowledge of the existence of a lode is not presumed from
mere production of a recorded location notice which predates application for the placer patent. Furthermore, the
discovery point on the lode must also lie within the boundary
of the placer to prove that such vein or lode does exist."
The most difficult problem in this area is presented
when the lode is located subsequent to the placer patent
application upon the basis that the lode was known to exist
at the date the placer patent application was filed. The lode
need not have been located to be "known to exist." The lode
must, however, contain demonstrable mineral of such extent
and value as to justify expenditures for the purpose of
extracting it."- The burden of proving the existence of a
"known lode" rests with the lode claimant and must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.25 Work done on
a lode subsequent to the date of the placer patent application
is not admissible to demonstrate that the .lode was "known"
prior to the patent application.2"
If the lode is not known to exist until the placer location
is completed and validated by a discovery, an entry upon
the unpatented placer claim by a prospective lode claimant
seeking to discover such an unknown lode is a trespass, unless
made with the express consent of the placer claimant. If
the lode claimant attempts to initiate his right to a lode and7
does so in trespass, no rights are acquired by his action.1
If, on the other hand, the lode is known to exist prior to the
22. 3 LINDLEY ON MINES § 781 (3d Ed. 1914).

23. Id.
24.

United States v. Iron and Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673, 683 (1888),
approved in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 321 (1905) ; see also Iron
and Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Gold and Silver Mining Co., 143
U.S. 394 (1892) ; and McConaghy v. Doyle, 32 Colo. 92, 75 P. 419 (1903).
25. E.g., Thomas v. South Butte Mining Company, 211 Fed. 105 (9th Cir.
1914).
26. Migeon v. Montana Central Rwy. Co., 77 Fed. 249 (9th Cir. 1896).
27. Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining & Land Co., 29 Colo. 377, 68 P. 286

(1902), aff'd, 194 U.S. 220 (1904).
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placer location, but the lode has not been acquired by anyone,
then the placer claimant must affirmatively locate that lode.
Otherwise, under 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1976), the placer claimant
evidences his intent not to claim the known lode and a third
party peaceably entering upon the placer location in order
to claim that known lode should not be viewed as a trespasser.
Such a lode claim would, however, be limited in width to
twenty-five feet on either side of the vein. Of course, if the
placer location is not supported by a discovery, a subsequent
lode claimant searching for unknown lodes could acquire
such lodes under a full-sized location, assuming the pedis
possessio rights of the prior placer claimant were not
violated by such acquisition.
Association Placer Claims
Section 35 of Title 30, U.S.C., provides that placer
claims are subject to entry and patent under the same
general rules which apply to lode claims, but where the
lands upon which placer claims are located have been previously surveyed, the entries shall conform to the legal subdivisions of the public lands. No placer location shall include
more than 20 acres for each individual claimant, and 30
U.S.C. § 36 states that no location of a placer claim shall
exceed 160 acres for any one person or association of persons. Many miners wish to take advantage of these two
provisions, collectively permitting 160-acre association placer
claims by eight bona fide locators, since a single discovery
will support an association placer just as it will support a
twenty-acre individual placer; surveying and recording costs
are greatly reduced; and one hundred dollars of assessment
work will serve to hold a 160-acre claim just as it will maintain a single twenty-acre placer. Nevertheless, association
placers inevitably lead to problems, usually because it is
difficult to satisfy the requirement that the location be made
by a bona fide association. 8
The two most significant problems which usually arise
in connection with association placers are commonly referred
note 7,ofat
407.
28. Hill,
supra
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to as the "excess acreage problem" and the "dummy locator
problem," two concepts that are often confused. The excess
acreage problem occurs when the association placer is located
by a bona fide association, but one or more of the locators
transfers his interest prior to discovery. If this interest is
transferred to another person within the association, the
twenty-acre individual acreage limitation is exceeded. Violation of the excess acreage rule does not result in invalidity
of the entire claim, but requires an amended location to
delete the excess acreage. Otherwise, a subsequent discovery
will not support the entire 160 acres and the claim may be
lost to a subsequent claimant. If the entire 160 acres is
transferred to an individual or corporation which later
makes a discovery, only the twenty acres surrounding the
discovery point are valid.2"
Corporations, particularly, are cautioned not to exceed
the twenty-acre limitation. Only in very special circumstances may a corporation acquire by conveyance or otherwise hold association placer claims." If a corporation acquires
an association placer, it must take care that each locator
receives equal consideration for the transfer and that the
location is supported by a discovery prior to the transfer.
Otherwise, an excess acreage problem is presented, one
which perhaps is best resolved by making new locations for
each twenty acre portion of the claim.81
The dummy locator problem is a fraud against the
United States and invalidates the claim entirely.2 In this
situation the association of claimants is not "bona fide";
instead, a claimant attempts to avoid the individual twentyacre per claim per claimant limitation. Thus, anywhere
from one to seven of the individuals will agree to have the
claim located in their names and then transfer their interests
to one or another of the locators. Any such intent, if formulated prior to making the location or prior to making a
discovery, will result in invalidation of the entire claim.
29. United States v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
30. Hill, supra note 7, at 411-16.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Toole, 224 F.Supp. 440 (D.C. Mont. 1963).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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After discovery, the locators may transfer their interests
as they see fit, but only if the claim was originally located
in good faith, i.e., with no intent to circumvent the twentyacre limitation. 8
The Practice of "Short Staking" Lode Mining Claims
Most miners and geologists are aware of instances
where lode claims exceeding 1500 feet in length or 600 feet
in width have been staked on the ground. Such survey
errors can leave "fractions" or small parcels of land lying
outside the boundaries of any valid claim, and this unappropriated land is open to location by third parties. This fact
is recognized by most locators, and attempts are made to
avoid this result. The goal of avoiding open fractions is a
laudable one, but, unfortunately for the locator, the common
methods of trying to achieve that goal often either fail or
create even more problems.
There are ways of avoiding the problems that may
result from slightly inaccurate surveys; however, many individuals who stake mining claims in the field have adopted
(perhaps even without the knowledge of the companies for
whom they are working) what we will refer to as "short
staking": the practice of actually measuring shorter distances on the ground than are recited in the location certificate or shown on the map. The amount of understaking
usually depends on the maximum likely survey error.
Thus, where the mining claimant is locating claims on
level ground at a relatively constant elevation, he may anticipate a maximum survey error of ten feet per claim. To
avoid leaving open ground, some claimants purposely attempt
to place the sideline posts 1490 feet apart to provide a margin
for error; however, in keeping with the "tradition" of locating full size claims, the locator usually recites in the location
certificate that the posts are 1500 feet apart. The objective
is to obtain an added ten foot "cushion" to rely upon if a
subsequent survey demonstrates that the initial survey was
as much as ten feet in error. At best, this practice guarantees
33. 1 by
AMERiCAN
LAWofOF
MINING Scholarship,
§ 5.23 (1980).1981
Published
Law Archive
Wyoming

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 1

422

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

the necessity of later amending the location certificate to
show the correct dimensions of the claim before a mineral
survey can be approved. In the worst cases, this practice
may make it impossible to resurvey this and other claims
with common corners accurately, may suggest the claim is
in the wrong quarter section, or may even require a later
admission by the claimant that he knowingly recorded an
incorrect map or certificate with the county recorder or
Bureau of Land Management.
The extent of the problem becomes more apparent when
the example of the practice of staking 590 feet endlines (and
reporting them to be 600 feet in length) is considered. It
requires nine "full size" (600 by 1500 feet) unpatented lode
mining claims staked side by side to extend along a section
line (the endlines of nine claims equal 5,400 feet and an
ideal section line is 5,280 feet long). However, as staked on
the ground, the actual endlines of nine claims that were
short staked by ten feet per claim equals only 5,310 feet.
The cumulative effect of this 88 foot per mile error in the
legal description, particularly when a locator stakes a block
of mining claims that extends over more than one section,
can result in a legal description (by reference to the quarter
section in which the claim is located) that the surveyor
knows is incorrect.3 4 As described on the official record (the
location certificate), a claim may be shown to lie in the
southern portion of Section eight when in fact the surveyor
knows that at least a portion (and perhaps all) of the claim
is in the northern portion of Section seventeen. In instances
such as these, the legal descriptions in location certificates
and on maps-which might be drafted to show the correct
claim dimensions-simply cannot be reconciled.
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (provides criminal penalties for "knowingly and willfully" making or using any "false writing or document knowing the same
to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry" in any

matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United

States). The Secretary of Interior has forwarded a draft bill to the
Speaker of the House to amend Section 314 of FLPMA to make this penalty provision expressly applicable to materials now required by FLPMA
to be filed with the BLM; cf, CoLO. REV. STAT. (1973) § 18-5-114 (requires
an intent to defraud) ; but see, Cal. [Pub.Res.] Code § 2313 (West 1972)
(requires only "willfully" making a false statement). See also Zwiefel v.
State, 517 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 1974).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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Problems are a virtual certainty when significant vertical slope corrections should be made but inclinometers are
not used. Then, a claimant using only a chain (but no plumb
bob) for measuring distances might anticipate much larger
errors and short stake claims by 50 or 100 feet. If 500 foot
by 1400 foot claims are staked (and the location certificates
recite that the claims are 600 foot by 1500 foot claims),
the short endlines necessitate staking eleven claims to cover
one section line-and a map prepared by reference to the
location certificates places two entire claims in the wrong
quarter section.
In addition to the problems resulting from a legal
description referring to an incorrect quarter section, indiscriminate short staking may appear to place even valid
discoveries on land that is apparently not open to location.
Because a valid discovery cannot be made on land not open
to location,"5 the location too must fail. 6 It is common to
establish discovery monuments on the endline of a claim or
ten feet from one endline. In such instances, when a mining
claimant stakes claims on the open sections in a checkerboard
land pattern (as is necessary in the vicinity of a railroad
grant), the ten foot short staking in the length of the sideline can result in a claim pattern that, when mapped according to the description recited in the location certificates,
places the "discoveries" on land not open to location.
There are, of course, several possible ways to locate
groups of lode mining claims to avoid such problems. One
solution is to rely on two general rules: monuments on the
ground control when in conflict with recorded legal descriptions; and, there can be no fractions if the amount of the
ground claimed does not exceed the maximum dimensions
permitted by statute. A locator would thus survey claim
boundaries on the ground that are 1490 feet in length by
590 feet in width (i.e., that account for the maximum anticipated error), recite that fact in the location certificate, and
properly identify monuments on the map. (When survey
35. E.g., Cram v. Church, 9 Utah 2d 169, 340 P.2d 1116 (1959).
36. 1 LINDLEY ON MINES § 338 (1897); 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF MINING § 4.35
(1980).
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errors might be as great as twenty-five feet in a 1500 foot
run, the claimant could locate claims 1475 feet in length by
590 feet in width.) Then, if a survey error (of up to the
allowed variance) did occur-the claimant could rely on the
monuments on the ground to establish the limits of the claim
and file an amended location certificate to correct the record.
In this instance, the incorrect measurement is not fatal
because the monuments on the ground control-assuming
that they have been maintained so that their original situs
can be ascertained." Monuments on the ground control, even
as to patented claims, where there is a conflict between the
monument and the description or call in the patent.3 " Where
monuments are not maintained, a misdescription in the
record may be fatal because, in general, to correct errors in
courses and distances, the monuments must be found."
PREDISCOVERY RIGHTS

After mining claims have been staked, some locators
apparently believe the land is theirs, and that all that is left
to be done is to return to the field as the weather permits
(and the budget for drilling operations allows), perform
assessment work, then drill out an ore body and open a mine.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The existence of
rival locators should not be ignored; if the locator stays
away too long, any mine that is opened might not be his.
Prior to the discovery of a valuable mineral within the
37.

Monuments for unpatented mining claims should be maintained as a routine
matter. If mining claimants maintained their monuments, junior locators

would have actual, not just constructive, notice of the senior locator's claim,
and many problems would be minimized.

Ordinary prudence will suggest

to the locator the advisability of preserving his marks, but the law does
not require it. Therefore, it has been held, that where all other necessary
acts of location are performed, a right vests in the locator, which cannot

be divested by the subsequent obliteration of the marks or removal of the
stakes without the fault of the locator. 1 LINDLEY ON MINES § 375 (1897),
citations omitted. See also, 1 W. SNYDER, MINES AND MINING § 399 (1902).
Actual notice of a senior locator's claim, which can more easily be given if
the senior locator's monuments are maintained, will overcome many "Minor"
deficiencies. See Rasmussen Drilling, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, 571 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1978), reh. denied (location notices identified the wrong section), and Globe Min. Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318
P.2d 373 (1957).
38. 30 U.S.C. § 34 (1976). See also cases cited in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING

§ 5.69 (1980).
39. Meyer-Clark-Rowe Mines Co. v. Steinfield, 9 Ariz. 245, 80 P. 400 (1905);
10 Ariz. 194, 85 P. 1067 (1906).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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limits of a mining claim, the locator establishes no rights
against the federal government, but he may be protected in
his possession of the claim against third parties by the
judicially-created doctrine of pedis possessio. Modern prospectors, however, desire title security that will make it
possible to systematically explore a substantial area of the
public domain for mineral deposits which are often lowgrade and buried at great depth. These deposits offer few,
if any, surface indications, and a considerable search (often
over a very large target area) is required before hoped-for
discoveries can possibly be made. To keep pace with the
evolution of exploration techniques, commentators have urged
that prediscovery protections be extended to encompass
entire target areas under exploration.4" This notion received
some degree of acceptance in the courts4' during the 1970's,
and considerable confusion has resulted. Until the 1971
decision in MacGuire v. Sturgis," the traditional protection
afforded by pedis possessio extended only to the ground occupied by a prospector or, at most, to the boundaries of each
claim occupied and worked by a locator. The present confusion surrounds application of the doctrine of pedis possessio to a large group or block of mining claims.
The "Traditional" View of Pedis Possessio
A prospector earns the protection of pedis possessio
before making a discovery by actual occupation of the public
domain while engaged in the active pursuit and diligent
search for a valuable mineral deposit. During this period
of activity, the prospector is, as against the government, a
mere tenant at will, but this tenancy is accorded protection
against forcible, fradulent, or clandestine instrusions upon
40. Fiske, Pedis Possessio-Modern Use of an Old Concept, 15 RocKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 181 (1969); A Judicial Approach to Updating the Mining
Laws of 1872-Pedis Possessio, 19 NAT. RES. J. 485 (1970); and Olson,
New Frontiers in Pedis Possessio: MacGuire v. Sturgis, 7 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 367 (1972).
41. MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971); Continental Oil
Co. v. Natrona Service, Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978) ; but see Geomet
Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344
(Ariz. App. 1979), rev'd, 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. S. Ct. 1979),
cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3813, 3814 (1980), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W.
3173 (1980) (U.S.S.C. Case No. 79-1203).
42. MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971).
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possession by third parties seeking to make rival locations.43
If either occupancy or diligent work toward discovery is
slackened, protection against rival locators is lost; the prospector's possessory rights may then be superseded by the
entry of a third party.
Traditionally," peris possessio has required actual and
continuous (as opposed to constructive) possession." What
constitutes actual possession will, of course, vary depending
upon the facts of each case. 6 While a prospector goes about
the diligent search for a valuable mineral, pedis possessio
also requires vigilance to prevent others from entering the
ground being explored, since his possession must be exclusive.4 Too often, however, prospectors assume that exclusive
possession alone will preserve their prediscovery rights.
Possession alone is quite insufficient to establish pedis
possessio, for the possession required is not merely that which
denies entry to competitors, but that which is necessary for
work directed toward discovery of a valuable mineral. "s
Under the traditional cases, work toward discovery must
actually and continuously be performed on the claim occupied to entitle the locator to the protection of pedis possessio
with respect to that claim. If no work is performed on a
claim, it is open to peaceable entry and appropriation by
rival locators.
Because it may be a factual and economic impossibility
to work and occupy each and every claim within a large
43. E.g., Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 294-295 (1920); and Union Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919). The protection afforded by pedia
possessio is, however, available only for a "reasonable time", although no
reported case has been found in which the tenure of occupancy was at issue.
Fiske, supra note 40, at 190-97.
44. By "traditionally," we mean the law as interpreted by the courts from
1872-1971.
45. Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith, 249 U.S.
337 (1919); Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. The Anaconda
Co., 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965); and Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234,
327 P.2d 308 (1958).
46. See Fiske, supra note 40, at 192-93, and cases cited in notes 34 and 35
thereof, as well as Garrard v. Silver Peak Mines, 82 Fed. 578, 591 (C.C.D.
Nev. 1897).
47. See Fiske, supra note 40, at 196-97.
48. Fiske, supra note 40, at 193-96, and cases cited therein. See also, Ohio
Oil Co. v. Kissinger, 60 I.D. 342 (1949); United States v. Ruddock, 52 L.D.
313 (1927); Isaac P. Clark, 48 L.D. 630 (1922); and L. W. Lowell, 40 L.D.
333 (1911), for the Interior Department's view of what then constituted
"diligent prosecution of work" toward discovery on oil shale placer claims.
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group, these legal standards render it virtually impossible
to acquire pedis possessio rights sufficient to protect an
entire block or group of mining claims prior to discovery.
Thus, the ground covered by a large group of claims is most
vulnerable to intrusions by rival locators.
The Bad Faith Defense
The risks of failing to comply with the strict traditional
requirements for pedis possessio are ameliorated somewhat
by recent developments concerning the so-called "bad faith"
defense. All too often, prospectors (or their lawyers) tend
to rely on this defense as a substitute for the work required
to achieve and maintain pedis possessio.4" This has resulted
in some unfortunate language in the case law which, in turn,
promotes such misplaced reliance. As a result, it may be
simpler, less expensive, and less venturesome to marshal
arguments attainting the intruder's motive than to comply
with the requirements for pedis possessio. An assumed added
advantage is that the focus shifts from the prospector's
activities (or lack thereof) to those of the intruder. Nevertheless, one should not overemphasize these recent developments for they seem to be based upon a misapprehension of
governing legal principles.
Whether the subsequent entry or intrusion by a third
party on the prediscovery possession of a prospector is in
bad faith or not depends upon the entrant's intent as demonstrated by (or divined from) his conduct. 50 The confusing
aspect of some of the bad faith defense cases arises from
language, quite comforting to the owners of large groups of
claims, which implies or states that a rival entry or intrusion
is in bad faith if made with knowledge of the existence of
the first prospector's prior claim to the ground.51
49. See Fiske, supra note 40, at 202-04.
50. Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development, Inc.,
468 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
51. See Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Co., 88 Ariz. 182, 354 P.2d 40 (1960); Woolsey v. Lassen, 91 Ariz. 229, 371 P.2d 587 (1962) ; Brown v. Murphy, 36 Cal.
App.2d 171, 97 P.2d 281 (1939); and Johnson v. Ryan, 43 N.M. 127, 86 P.2d
1040 (1939). But see, Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium
Corp., supra note 41, at 1343, "clarifying" (i.e., modifying) Bagg and
supra. of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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Two fairly recent cases, Ranchers Exploration and
Development Co. v. The Anaconda Company" and Columbia
Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development,
Inc.,53 illustrate the present confusion in this area. Attempts
by junior locators in both cases to locate claims, as a result
of the senior locators' failure to achieve or maintain pedis
possessio protection, were defeated because bad faith was
attributed to the intruders.
In the first of these cases, Ranchers questioned Anaconda's occupancy of, and work upon, certain lode locations
within a block of claims blanketing an area in excess of
five square miles. With respect to the disputed claims upon
which Anaconda could not prove discoveries, the court ruled
that Anaconda was neither in actual occupancy nor diligently
working to make discoveries. Nevertheless, the court refused
to enjoin Anaconda from preventing locations by Ranchers,
relying upon "the inherent limitation of the mining law," 4
which extends an invitation to appropriate portions of the
public domain only to those seeking to do so in good faith.
The general legal proposition advanced by the court to
govern its factual analysis of Ranchers' bad faith" is that
one cannot take unfair advantage of a competitor, e.g., by
improving one's position in an unconscionable manner at the
expense of another:
[B]elief in the efficacy of legal technicality is not
the only inquiry on the question of good faith. Good
faith also necessarily involves an honest intention
to abstain from taking any unconscionable advantage of another even through the forms or technicalities of law. Knowledge of an adverse claim does
52. Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. The Anaconda Co., 248 F.
Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965).
53. Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development, Inc.,
468 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
54. Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. The Anaconda Co., supra
note 52, at 727, n. 59, quoting Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337
(1919).
55. The bad faith here was attributed to Ranchers from the conduct of one
Ford, who, inter alia, orchestrated the attempted relocations for Ranchers
(utilizing information obtained while in the employ of one of Anaconda's
predecessors in title and in purported negotiations with the owner which
eventually leased the claims to Anaconda) on lands which Ford believed
to contain mineralization not yet exposed by Anaconda. Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. The Anaconda Co., supra note 52, at 729-31.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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not of itself indicate bad faith and may not even
be evidence of it unless accompanied by some improper means to defeat such claim."
This statement, and in particular the portion emphasized,
represents what ought to be the single limitation on those
seeking to relocate claims which a senior locator is not entitled to hold under pedis possessio: If the senior appropriator sleeps on, and thus forfeits, his pedis possessio rights,
there is no reason why a subsequent entrant should be
penalized unless he seeks to deepen that repose by improper
means or induces it in the first place.
Regrettably, the Tenth Circuit refused to take such a
sensible approach in Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers
Exploration & Development, Inc.," which is fraught with
potential mischief and confusion. Staking of 157 lode mining
claims by Columbia over an area previously staked by
Ranchers was held to be in bad faith. Columbia examined
relevant land records and thus was aware of Ranchers' prior
claims and the affidavits of annual labor filed by Ranchers,
but Columbia alleged that there were defects in Ranchers'
location certificates and affidavits with respect to the performance of validation work. At no time did Columbia inquire of anyone about Ranchers' activities or examine Ranchers' claims individually for signs of such activity. The
court found bad faith on these cumulative facts. As a result,
junior locators now have an apparent legal duty to inquire
into the extent of work previously performed on the claims
they hope to jump, which duty cannot be fulfilled absent an
actual, physical, claim-by-claim inspection." This duty exists
even if the junior locator is met by no resistance.
To reach this result, the Tenth Circuit may have misapplied existing mining law principles and thereby created
a doctrine which is potentially far more protective of prediscovery rights than pedis possessio. Generic legal principles
56. Ranchers Exploration and Development Co., v. The Anaconda Co., supra
note 52, at 731. [Emphasis supplied; footnotes deleted.]
57. Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development, Inc.,
supra note 53.
58. Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development, Inc.,
note
53, atof549-50.
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applicable in more typical situations confronting the courts,
but which have refined counterparts in the mining law, were
applied wholesale to a claim jumping situation. No heed was
paid to the historical basis of the mining law concerning
claim jumping. Consequently, the concept of good faith and
title standards developed with reference to other types of
property interests replaced their refined mining law counterparts. A continued failure on the part of the courts to apply
mining law principles to these types of controversies may
result in an evisceration of the doctrine of pedis possessio.
First, Columbia Standardmisapplies the general notion
that, in title disputes, one must rely on the strength of his
own title rather than defects in the title of the person he
seeks to dispossess. In a pedis possessio context, this should
only require a showing that the junior locator properly
located his claims in good faith under the General Mining
Law. At that point, the junior locator should then be allowed
to demonstrate that the senior locator failed to maintain
possession as required under the doctrine of pedis possessio.
"Good faith," as it applies to a locator under the mining
laws, depends upon whether the locator claims the ground
for mining purposes." "Good faith" under Columbia Standard, however, depends upon notice and inquiry. This misapplication of legal principles renders all recorded mining
locations presumptively valid, which, even if correct, is
nevertheless, only a presumption which the junior locator
should be allowed to overcome. Admittedly, the court gave
lip service to this right,"0 but its analysis effectively rendered
that right an empty one. The validity of Ranchers' claims
never became an issue. Nevertheless, the question should
have been who had a better right to the ground, unless
Ranchers could have shown that Columbia took unfair ad59. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881) ; United States v. Noguiera, 403 F.2d
816 (9th Cir. 1968). See also the criticism of Columbia Standard at 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.96. It should be emphasized, however, that
"good faith" for purposes of making a relocation, as in Belk or Columbia
Standard, must be distinguished from "good faith" in other endeavors,
such as the performance of annual assessment work. See Sherwood, Improvement of Mining Claims," 18 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 149, 177-88

(1972).
60. Columbia Standard Corp. v. Ranchers Exploration & Development, Inc.,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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vantage of some pre-existing relationship or bore some responsibility for the defects in Ranchers' claims it sought to
exploit."
Since Columbia was never allowed to show that Ranchers was not in possession, its entire case was lost. If
Ranchers was not in possession, the mining laws provided
it with no protection against forcible, fraudulent, clandestine
or surreptitious entries. Only after it is determined that a
senior locator failed to meet the requirements of pedis
possessio is the concept of good faith, as developed under
other legal doctrines, relevant. The aim of the mining laws
is to encourage development and reward those who act;
thus, a location made in good faith under the mining laws,
for mining purposes, should only be set aside in favor of a
senior locator (not entitled to rights afforded by the doctrine
of pedis possessio and not in possession of a valid claim) if
the junior locator acted in bad faith toward the senior locator
by taking advantage of a preexisting legal relationship or
misleading information.
Perhaps the confusion in this area could be cleared up
with a change of terminology which differentiates between
good faith required under the mining law and good faith
required toward a competitor. Usage of terms like breach
of fiduciary duty and fraud would be more apt, and less
confusing, than an indiscriminate application of the terms
good faith and bad faith to describe the limited duty owed
by a junior locator to a senior locator that fails to adequately
protect his possessory rights prior to discovery. The good
faith required of a junior locator would then properly be that
which is required under the mining laws. Equitable doctrines of general applicability would come into play only
after the mining law question of possession is settled; the
proper remedy for inequitable conduct on the part of a
61.

It is quite possible that the result in Columbia was proper, based upon this

analysis, but the court placed little emphasis on the fact that a Columbia

employee (instrumental in the overstaking venture) was well-acquainted
with Ranchers' claims and activities. Through a previous employment
relationship, this Columbia employee participated in negotiations with
Ranchers regarding the validity of the very claims Columbia overstaked.
& Development, Inc.,
Ranchers Exploration
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junior locator prevailing under the mining law would then
be imposition of a constructive trust on the claims.
Expansion of the Protection Afforded by Pedis Possessio
The first real breakthrough for the proponents of expanding the doctrine of pedis possessio so that it might
apply on a group or area basis to a significant number of
unpatented mining claims was achieved in MacGuire v.
Sturgis.6" This decision upheld the possessory right of
MacGuire to almost 1,800 unpatented lode mining claims,
prior to discovery on any of them, based upon the inception
of a drilling program on a few of the claims pursuant to a
comprehensive exploration program designed to systematically explore all the claims. The entire holding is summed
up in the following conclusion of law:
8. Plaintiff's entry onto the land covered by
the MacGuire claims was peaceable and not fraudulant [sic] or clandestine, and Plaintiff is presently
entitled to the exclusive possession thereof on a
group or area basis where, as here, the following
exists or was done for his benefit: (a) the geology
of the area claimed is similar and the size of the
area claimed is reasonable; (b) the discovery (validation) work referred to in Wyo. Stat. § 30-6
(1957) is completed; (c) an overall work program
is in effect for the area claimed; (d) such work
program is being diligently pursued, i.e., a significant number of exploratory holes have been systematically drilled; and (e) the nature of the mineral claimed and the cost of development would
make it economically impracticable to develop the
mineral if the locator is awarded only those claims
on which he is actually present and currently working. Plaintiff is entitled to the future exclusive
possession thereof so long as he, or his successors
in title, remain in possession thereof, working diligently towards a discovery.6"
This holding obviously borrows much from the concept of
group assessment work and is the ultimate extension of the
62. MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971).

63. Id. at 584-85.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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doctrine of pedis possessio from a single claim to a reasonable number of claims grouped together. Moreover, it very
clearly reflects current practices in mineral exploration."4
It is, however, a substantial departure from prior law and,
when put to its most recent test, was expressly rejected in
the Geomet case.
The Geomet Case
The reported facts of the Geomet case65 are fairly
straightforward. Lucky Mc Uranium Corporation (ironically
referred to by the court as "Lucky"), the senior locator,
discovered anomalies indicative of the presence of uranium
by airborne reconnaissance during the late summer of 1976.
Shortly thereafter, after further investigation, Lucky located
200 lode mining claims. Barely one month later, Geomet
(after its own "extensive" reconnaissance) began drilling
on one of the Lucky claims and promptly located seven claims
in conflict with the Lucky claims. It was not disputed that
Geomet was aware of the Lucky claims, but Geomet argued
that Lucky had made no discovery; therefore, if Lucky was
not in possession, the land was open to location by Geomet.
The trial court found that neither party had made a discovery, and the court of appeals agreed. The question then
became whether Lucky was entitled to retain exclusive possession against Geomet by virtue of pedis possessio.
64. It must be admitted that this was the perfect factual situation for the
plaintiff to convince the court to issue a landmark ruling. Frankly, the
work and effort of defendant Sturgis, as characterized by the court, was
shoddy at best. By contrast, the work of MacGuire in locating, staking,
monumenting, and recording almost 1,800 claims, and then validating each
one of them with the required discovery work, can only be described as
impeccable. This may be the reason that the court imposed the requirement
in subparagraph (b) of its holding, quoted above, that the validation work
required by the Wyoming Statutes must be completed before pedis possessio
can be applied on a group basis. This portion of the holding is anomalous,
and we can perceive no rational reason to require that all of the acts of
location (except, of course, discovery itself) be completed before a prospector is entitled to the protection of pedis possessio. Where, however, a
locator attempts to apply the doctrine to a large area of claims, many of
which are not actually occupied, it does make sense that he be required to
locate his claims properly and to do the required work on the ground to
provide some evidence to all who may be interested in the same ground
that he is indeed serious about maintaining and pursuing his rights on a
group basis.
65. Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 60, 601
P.2d 1344 (Ariz. App. 1979), r'ev'd, 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. S.
Ct. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3813, 3814 (1980), cert. dismissed, 49
Case No.1981
79-1203).
3173 (1980)
(U.S.S.C.
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The Arizona Court of Appeals found that Lucky was
in actual physical occupancy of the claims since Lucky properly noticed, posted, recorded, and then validated by drilling,
each of its claims pursuant to Arizona law. Moreover, Lucky
was in the process of drilling deep exploration holes on other
claims in the group, and Geomet was aware of this fact.
Further, the court of appeals concluded without discussion
that the geology of the area claimed was similar and the
size of the area was reasonable. Geomet urged that a traditional application of the doctrine of pedis possessio was
called for and that it should prevail since Lucky was not in
actual physical possession of the seven disputed claims. This
contention was dismissed with reliance on MacGuire v.
Sturgis. Moreover, in response to Geomet's argument that it
entered openly and peacefully, thereby preventing Lucky
from invoking pedis possessio, the court stated that "It is
our opinion that a peaceful and open intrusion is just as
rights as a violent or surdamaging to one's pre-discovery
66
intrusion.
reptitious
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. 7 Its opinion begins by noting that compliance with statutory requisites for
location is virtually meaningless prior to actual discovery
of minerals in place. The court then follows this correct
conclusion by stating that pedis possessio literally requires
actual occupancy as distinguished from constructive possession. After a brief review of previous authorities, the court
made the following observation in response to Lucky's reliance on MacGuire:
If one may, by complying with preliminary formalities of posting and recording notices, secure for
himself exclusive possession of a large area upon
only a small portion of which he is actually working, then he may, at his leisure, explore the entire
area and exclude all others who stand ready to
peaceably and openly enter unoccupied sections for
the purpose of discovering minerals. Such a premise
is laden with extreme difficulties of determining
66. Id. at 601 P.2d 1339, 1347.
67. Id. at 1339.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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over how large an area and for how long one might
be permitted to exclude others.6 8
Accordingly, the court expressly held that pedis possessio
protects only claims actually occupied for the purpose of
work that is directed toward discovery, and does not extend
to contiguous, unoccupied claims on a group or area basis.
The United States Supreme Court, as urged by the Justice Department, granted certiorari to review the Arizona
Supreme Court decision, but the writ was dismissed shortly
thereafter at the request of the parties. As a result, pedis
possessio controversies may now turn on the choice of forum.
Federal courts have been the only ones to recognize broad
prediscovery rights; state courts do not seem to have such
an inclination to reshape the law, although it must be admitted that few such opportunities have been presented to
them in recent years. To protect themselves, locators of large
blocks of mining claims are best advised to make the most
of what the traditional view of pedis possessio provides.
The obvious but difficult solution is to make a discovery
on each claim. Under the liberal rule of discovery which
applies in controversies between rival locators, it may be
possible to expose mineralization on a large number of claims
without a great deal of cost. This is particularly true when
prospecting in formerly active areas, even if the mineral
now sought is not the one previously mined in the area.
Where this is possible, as in the old gold and silver camps,
the additional costs will be justified as a sort of title insurance. For example, a sampling of rock in place could be taken
from each claim and then assayed. If evidence of mineralization can thus be established, there may well be a discovery
sufficient to meet the liberal test of Castle v. Womble." At
that point, proper performance of annual assessment work
should suffice to hold the claims on which such discoveries
have been made as against rival locators. Where this is not
possible, the best practice is to stay in the field whenever
weather permits, drill fast, and patrol the premises.
68. Id. at 1342.
69. 19 L. D. 455 (1894).
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THE NECESSITY FOR DISCOVERY

The importance of making a discovery on each claim

located or acquired by a mining claimant should not be
underestimated. Discovery is the most basic requirement
of the General Mining Law, but it is also "most universally
ignored by modern mining locators."7 The locator of a mining claim obtains no rights against the United States until
he has made a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit within
the limits of his claim.7' Prior to discovery on any given
claim, the rights of a locator to that claim are tenuous, at
best, vis-a-vis the government and perhaps surprisingly
limited with respect to rival locators.
The scope of this article does not include an examination
of the complexities of the discovery requirement,72 but the
presence or absence of discovery may have significant consequences. Prior to discovery, the mining claimant is protected only by the rights of pedis possessio. Only after
discovery is the locator safe in taking the position that

assessment work will protect the claim against a third party
claimant."3 Another important point regarding discovery
involves the different standards applicable to controversies
between rival claimants and those between a claimant and
the federal government. A far more practical standard of
discovery is applied in cases involving rival locators com-

pared with that to which the government holds a locator
70. Dempsey, Basic Problems In Locating Claims, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 573, 587 (1968).
71. E.g., Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1963), and
cases cited therein.
72. For two excellent discussions of this complex topic, see Reeves, The Law of
Discovery Since Coleman, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 415 (1975), and
Reeves, The Origin and Development of the Rules of Discovery, 8 LAND AND
WATER L. REV. 1 (1973). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, §§ 4.134.106 (1980).
73. Because large exploration "target" areas are typically blanketed by claims,
it often happens that the mineral deposits discovered (particularly if they
are in isolated pods) will not be of sufficient size to provide evidence of
mineralization on each claim. Before the ore body has been delineated, some
claims will not be supported by a discovery. Thus, if litigation is initiated,
the court should apply group assessment work concepts to some claims
within the group and the law of pedis possessio to those claims upon which
no discovery has been made. Two good examples are Ranchers Exploration
and Development Co. v. The Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah
1965) ; and Continental Oil Co. v. Natrona Service, Inc., 588 F.2d 792, 795,
800-01 (10th Cir. 1978), in which the trial court granted judgment to
Conoco, notwithstanding the jury's verdict, on 19 claims upon which it
apparently had established a discovery.
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when it contests mining claims. 74 To prove a discovery sufficient to prevail against a rival locator, the mining claimant
must meet only the "liberal" or "prudent man rule" of
Castle v. Womble,75 while the more rigorous marketability/
profitability test approved in United States v. Coleman,"e
applies to cases involving the government.
A final point to remember, especially where a large
group of mining claims is involved, is that a discovery cannot
be proven except with reference to exposed mineralization
within each claim in question. Mining companies often infer
the presence of mineralization on some claims by examining
data produced from other ground. Such information serves
as a practical guide to exploration and development, but is
of no use in proving discovery on a claim where the locator
has not exposed mineralization. Since a discovery must be
proven on each claim, mineralization must be actually demonstrated to have been found on each claim; proof by mere
inference will not suffice."
The ultimate necessity of making a discovery on each
and every claim is obvious, because, until a discovery is
made, a mining claimant is forced to rely upon somewhat
tenuous pre-discovery rights of possession. Yet, in some
instances, budgetary restraints and management goals related to the amount of ore required to support a viable
mining operation seem to override sound legal advice as to
the importance of trying to make a discovery as quickly as
possible on each and every mining claim suspected of including a portion of an ore body.
74. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 323 (1905): "[W]hen the controversy
is between two mineral claimants, the rule respecting the sufficiency of a
discovery of mineral is more liberal. . . ." See generally 2 LINDLEY ON
MINES § 336 (3d ed. 1914), and 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 4.46 and
4.47 (1980).
75. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894): "[W]here minerals have been
found and the evidence is of such a character that a person of ordinary
prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and
means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable
mine, the requirements of the statute have been met."
76. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968). See especially Reeves,
The Law of Discovery Since Coleman, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAW INST. 415
(1975).
77. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 4.95 (1980) and cases cited therein. See
also Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. The Anaconda Company,
supra note 52, at 714, 717-20.
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For example, assume the situation where the existence
of an ore body is confirmed by drilling, but subsequent
drilling on adjacent claims exposes no mineralization; thus,
the most optimistic estimate of known or proven reserves is
only one-half of the amount needed to justify constructing
a mill. Alternatively, the exploration budget for the year
might already have been exhausted. Assume further that the
project geologist suspects that two other ore bodies might
exist near the known deposit. The known deposit is at this
point covered by two claims upon which discoveries have
been made and, in part, by four other claims in which barren
holes have been drilled. Lawyers and management in this
example are likely to have different ideas about what to do
next.
To the lawyer, it is obvious that further drilling should
proceed around the known ore body until a discovery has
been made on each of the six claims beneath which the known
ore body is presumed to extend. To management, it is equally
obvious either that additional money is not then available
for drilling or that it is futile to make a discovery on each
of the remaining four claims if the total reserves would still
be only one-half of what is required to justify building a
mill. This management decision may result in the loss of
that portion of the known ore body outside the two valid
claims, since the remaining four claims which have not been
validated by drilling or otherwise exposing mineralization
are subject to a number of foreseeable and unpleasant events:
the federal government may withdraw the land from mineral
location; a junior locator, after the senior locator completes
his ritual of performing annual assessment work and leaves
for the winter, may make the first discovery on these four
claims adjacent to the two upon which discoveries have been
made; or another "interested party", such as the owner of
78. In Thomas v. Andrus, 552 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977) reh. denied, the circuit
court of appeals affirmed, per curiam, a district court decision, Thomas v.
Morton, 408 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Ariz, 1976), that owners of Stock Raising
Homestead Act lands who also were grazing permittees of the United
States had standing to maintain a private contest contesting the validity
of the defendant's unpatented mining claims. (The surface owners apparently located their own claims on the ground after the senior locator's
claims had successfully been contested.)
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surface or grazing rights, may contest the validity of the
claims."'
RELOCATION AND AMENDMENT OF LODE CLAIMS

As emphasized above, discovery initiates the locator's
title to an unpatented mining claim. At some point after
discovery and prior to patent, especially where a large
group of claims is involved, it often is necessary to amend
or relocate some of the claims. Problems concerning whether
to relocate or amend claims are not particularly ponderous
until discoveries have been made on the claims. Prior to that
time, a relocation or amendment only affects pedis possessio
rights; a relocation or amendment which corresponds with
a discovery actually constitutes a new and original location
or, perhaps, the completion of a previously incomplete location.79 Once an ore body is delineated, the claims should be
properly aligned to secure maximum statutory rights and
to avoid improperly claiming excess ground. The Interior
Department asserts that it is powerless to issue a mineral
patent to any surface ground exceeding 300 feet in width
on each side "of the middle of the vein or at the surface.", °
Thus, the center line of each claim, insofar as is possible,
should be aligned with the discovery.
Large groups or blocks of mining claims are apt to pose
very difficult amendment and relocation problems. These
problems are a virtual certainty if the group has been acquired from a third party, if competitors are active in the
area, or if the area has been extensively worked in the past.
All too often, the acquiring company will not be able to piece
together an accurate and complete history of the many
claims and, thus, cannot reach definite conclusions with
respect to their validity. The goal of the acquiring company
is to gain maximum benefit from its acquisition, and in so
doing it must minimize the possibility that unknown adverse
claimants might be able to establish superior rights. In such
79. Reeves, Amendment v. Relocation, 14 ROCKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 207, at 220
(1968). This article presents an excellent and thorough analysis of problems presented in amending and relocating mining claims.
80. See 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976).
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instances, it is often necessary to amend and relocate at
least the most strategically situated claims to cover the ore
body completely.
Amendment and relocation problems are exacerbated if
the large target area was assembled by lease or purchase
from a variety of owners. Such large blocks are often
amended or relocated to straighten the lines of the claims,
to eliminate fractions, overlaps, and oversized claims, and,
in general, to piece together a readily identifiable and, hopefully, secure claim situation, at least with respect to the ore
body."' The problem here is whether and how to amend
and/or relocate. Differing state laws on this subject further
complicate matters. A procedure successfully charted with
reference to the laws of one state may be inadequate if
applied in another. For simplicity, we will use the two
pertinent Colorado statutes as an example.
Under the first Colorado statute, an "additional [location] certificate" may be filed without waiver of existing
rights (if the change does not interfere with the existing
rights of others) to correct defective or erroneous original
certificates, to cure legal requirements which had not been
complied with before filing, or to change surface boundaries
in order to take in any overlapping claim which has been
abandoned. 2 The second Colorado statute governs only relocation by appropriating an abandoned lode claim. When
relocating an abandoned claim, a new discovery shaft (or
map) is required and new boundaries must be marked on
the ground, just as with the location of a new claim.8
Basic questions under these statutes are whether to
proceed under one or the other, and whether the benefits
of both may be obtained by completely complying with both.
For a purchaser, the utility of the second statute is questionable since it is designed primarily for the relocation of
abandoned claims by third parties or strangers to the existing claims. No harm, however, is probably done by comply81. Reeves, supra note 79, at 208.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-43-115 (1973).
83. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-43-116 (1973).
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ing with the additional requirements of that statute. The
"paper" amendments initially provided for under the first
statute are referred to by one commentator as amendments
of record;84 but that statute also provides for relocation by
amendment of the claim on the ground and by acquisition of
additional ground upon abandonment."
A mere paper amendment will not cure a void claim,
i.e., one for which the locator failed to comply with a material
statutory requirement. The ground must then be properly
relocated. Whenever new ground is taken in, boundaries must
be remonumented and the amended or additional certificate
must accurately describe the expanded claim. No new discovery is required unless the new or expanded claim, as relocated, does not include the original discovery. A new discovery under these circumstances is treated as a new location.
Correct or proper location work done under the original
location may, however, be adopted by the relocator, but these
corrective acts take effect only as of the date of the new
discovery. 6
In order to be valid, any relocation must be made upon
ground which is open to location. A problem with large
blocks of claims acquired from third parties is that claims
designated for relocation may be situated so as to overlap
ground which is within a prior valid claim. If the titles to
several layers of claims can be aggregated into one ownership, it may still be impossible to know which layer is valid.
In this case, one suggested solution is to consolidate the
claims by first aligning the boundaries of the several layers.
This, of course, assumes that the claims may all be identified
on the ground from recorded descriptions or existing monuments; if this is not possible, the imperfect descriptions
should first be made more definite for inclusion in an additional location notice. Surveys should be made, maps prepared, and overlaps and open fractions eliminated by redefining boundaries, both on paper and on the ground. Then,
84. Reeves, upra note 79, at 212-13.
85. See Reeves, supra note 79, at 213-18.
86. Id.
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amended location notices should be recorded, reciting that
each is an amendment of all the claims covering the particular ground."7
In Colorado, however, it appears that the approach suggested above may not be completely workable. Logically, the
owner of a contiguous group of claims should be able to
adjust his interior boundaries to meet his needs, but in
Colorado there appears to be no authority for any such
logical deviation from the general rule that a relocation, in
order to be valid, must be made on ground which is open to
location. 8 Unless the locator abandons the ground embraced
by a senior claim, to the extent that it is covered by his own
junior claim, the junior claim takes none of the conflicting
ground. 9 An otherwise valid junior claim may be invalidated,
in whole or in part, if it is relocated over a valid senior
claim. Therefore, the owner of conflicting and overlapping
claims may find it necessary to abandon (rather than consolidate) conflicting claims in order to create vacant ground
upon which to place his relocated claims. Relocation of recent
claims without regard to the validity and existence of underlying older claims, or, conversely, relocation of older claims
which may have been forfeited by valid relocations in intervening years, may result in gaps or "windows" in coverage.
Therefore, it is probably necessary to abandon wholly or in
part, as the relative positions and priorities of the tracts may
indicate, conflicting valid claims. Only after having opened
the ground to location in this manner is it safe to relocate
upon the vacated ground. It is also a good idea to provide
expressly for abandonment by filing a document reflecting
that intent.
GROUP ASSESSMENT WORK

After surmounting the difficult tasks of making a discovery on each claim and properly aligning his claims, the
owner of a group of mining claims need no longer worry
87. Reeves, supra note 79, at 229-30.
88. Brown v. Gurney, 201 U.S. 184 (1906).
89. Compare Moorhead v. Erie Mining and Milling Co., 43 Colo. 408, 96 P. 253
(1908), with Emerson v. Akin, 26 Colo. App. 40, 140 P. 481 (1914).
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about relocations, amendments, and the problems associated
with pedis possessio. Thereafter, his claims may be maintained by compliance with statutory requirements. The primary federal requirement is commonly known as "annual
assessment work."9 A prevalent misapprehension about
assessment work, however, springs from the practical necessity of locating mining claims in advance of discovery.
Established practice among mining companies is to promptly
commence and complete assessment work during the fiscal
assessment year following that year during which the claim
was located.91 As emphasized previously, however, a valid
location must be founded upon the discovery of valuable
mineral. Prior to discovery, assessment work serves no legal
(as opposed to geological or practical) purpose except insofar as such annual labor may aid in the establishment of
pedis possessio rights.9" This is not to imply that assessment
work should not be performed (and the proper documentation filed to verify it) in advance of discovery. Performance
of assessment work and the filing of the required documentation serves notice that the locator is serious about maintaining and developing his claims. Moreover, it might be
argued by the government that it is essential to prevent the
locations from being declared "abandoned and void" under
FLPMA and its regulations.9
Group Assessment Work Requirements
In general, the statute governing annual assessment
work is satisfied for a group of unpatented mining claims
on which discoveries have been made when the following
four requirements are met: (1) The aggregate value of
labor and improvements is at least one hundred dollars per
claim within the group; (2) The claims are held under
common ownership, or there is a community of interest
90. See 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976).
91. For a discussion of the complications in determining when assessment work
should commence, see Assessment Work Manual (RocKY MTN. MIN. L.
FNDN. 1971), Chapter 6.
92. Cole v .Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Smith, 249
U.S. 337 (1919); see also Assessment Work Manual (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
FNDN. 1971), ch. 6 at p. 6-3, and Fiske, supra note 40, at 189-90.
93. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.4 (1979).
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among the owners of the claims considered and treated as
a group for purposes of compliance with the statutory requirements; (3) Annual expenditures benefit, or at least
tend to benefit, all claims within the group by reasonably
facilitating their development; and (4) The claims are
contiguous.
Each of these requirements for group assessment work
will be discussed individually, but, with the possible exception of contiguity as noted below, all must be met simultaneously.
1. $100 Per Claim Requirement and the Problem of Allocation
The law clearly mandates that the aggregate value of
each year's expenditures for development or improvements
equal or exceed one hundred dollars times the total number
of mining claims within the group to which the work is to
be applied and apportioned as assessment work. Each $100
worth of work or improvements must be of value to the
claim or claims, or it will not qualify. To get into trouble
with the $100 per claim requirement then, one must do too
little, do what appears to be adequate in an ineffective
manner, or do enough but fail to state the correct amount
in an affidavit of labor. Assuming that some beneficial work
was in fact performed during the fiscal assessment year,
but that not enough was appropriately done to maintain the
entire group, the question becomes how the effective values
should be allocated within the group.
From the claimant's point of view, the most satisfactory
allocation procedure permits the owner of a group of claims
to apportion the work performed as he sees fit.94 The leading
case in support of this rule is Utah Standard Mining Co. v.
94. For purposes of the present discussion, it is assumed that the other three
requirements for group assessment work, and in particular the benefit
test, have been satisfied. Obviously, no matter how much money is spent
or how much work is put into a group of unpatented mining claims, if such
money or efforts are of no benefit to one or more claims within the group,
the owner of the claims cannot satisfy the assessment work requirement
for those claims.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/1
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Tintic Indian Chief Mining and Milling Co., 95 and the only

limitation imposed by the court on the owner in making this
selection is that the claim or claims upon which work was
performed must be included in the group maintained by the
work performed. 6 A second and different rule for allocation
requires that the dollar value of work be apportioned equally
to each claim within the group. This rule is also applied by
the Interior Department to determine whether a mineral
patent application for a group of claims demonstrates sufficient improvements to justify approval of the application.
Where the equal apportionment rule is applied, the owner
of a group of claims may not be able to maintain his claims
against a junior locator on the basis of compliance with the
assessment work requirement.
These two rules are not, however, necessarily inconsistent. They may be harmonized if the justification for the
equal apportionment rule is based upon the fact that the
owner affirms that he has performed sufficient work to
maintain all of his claims. Having made such a representation, the owner should be held to it. With the advent of
FLPMA and under state statutes requiring the filing of
annual affidavits of labor, a representation that sufficient
work was performed to maintain the group of claims should
be made annually. Under this analysis, the owner claiming
group assessment work will be held to his representation that
a sufficient amount of labor or improvements was performed
95. Utah Standard Mining Co. v. Tintic Indian Chief Mining and Milling Co.,
73 Utah 456, 274 P. 950 (1929). The court stated: "There is no principle
of law that we are aware of which asserts that, if the owner of a group
of 22 claims undertakes to do the annual work for that group, and as a
consolidated group, and performs only the labor necessary for 9 claims,
he loses the benefit of that work on 9 claims, provided it is in fact performed on one of the 9 claims in such a way as to benefit the remaining
8, as well as the one upon which performed." Id. at 951.
96. Note also that in jurisdictions adhering to the contiguity requirement, it
would seem that the owner's selection would be further restricted in acrequirement.
with that
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or made. The owner should know if his representation is
correct, and, if it is not, should abide the consequences." '
When an apportionment situation arises, for whatever
reason, the preferred procedure is to file an affidavit of
labor claiming assessment work only on the correct number
of claims. As to the claims not benefited, or for which an
insufficient amount of labor is expended, a notice of intention to hold should be filed. Of course, work should be resumed promptly to prevent a relocation of the claims for
which the notice of intent to hold was filed.
2. Claims Held in Common
The statutory requirement that a group of claims be
"held in common" before assessment work is allowed to be
applied to the entire group of claims is the most frequently
discussed group assessment work requirement in the case
law. For purposes of this paper, it shall be referred to as the
"community of interest" requirement. The concept of community of interest is well illustrated in New Mercur Mining
Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 8 the leading case in this
area of the law on group assessment work, where the Utah
Supreme Court remarked:
Community of interest can only pertain where there
are separate claims or separate owners. Where the
claims are owned in common, or all by one person,
97. There is also a third rule of apportionment, to the effect that the owner
can only maintain the claims upon which the work was actually performed,
regardless of the aggregate expenditure, if the aggregate is insufficient
to maintain the entire group claimed. 2 AMERICAN LAw OF MINING § 7.20
(1980). This rule seems to be a facile and unsatisfactory compromise. It
cannot be harmonized with the statute, its underlying rationale, or any
notion of equity. The whole purpose of permitting group assessment work
is to allow the maintenance of more than those claims upon which work is
actually performed because it is impractical and economically ludicrous to
require work each year on each claim if the work performed benefits those
claims on which no work was physically performed. Only where an owner
claims to have performed work which was not in fact performed should
there be a penalty such as would be imposed under this third rule of
apportionment. As a result, this rule finds little, if any, support in the
case law. See, Fredericks v. Clauser, 52 Ore. 110, 96 P. 679 (1908), where
less than $200 of labor was performed, and Swanson v. Kettler, 17 Idaho
321, 105 P. 1059 (1909). Also, compare the original decision in James v.
Krook, 42 Ariz. 322, 25 P. 2d 1026 (1938), with the one on rehearing, 42
Ariz. 465, 27 P. 2d 519 (1933).
98. New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 128
P.2d 269, 275 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943).
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and the assessment work done in one of them, the
community of interest in the claims is a legal one
and the community of interest in the assessment
work is a natural consequence of this legal community of interest. Where there are separate owners
the community of interest may in some measure be
the amenability of the claims to a common development. However, if the assessment is done off the
land of any claimant it is not certain that such
community of interest would be sufficient. In such
case it would seem that there must be some common
right in the assessment work. The owner or owners
of the claims whose continued possessory right is
made to depend on the development work must have
a legal relationship to the work if it is to inure to
the benefit of the claim or claims for which it is
contended it was done. Where there is a legal relationship between the owner of the land on which the
development work is done and the owner of the
land claims, it may be sufficient to create the community of interest in the workings depending on the
nature of that relationship.
The community of interest problem arises when the
groups, or individual claims within one group, to which
the assessment work is sought to be applied are owned by
different persons, combinations, or entities. In those cases,
the party or parties owning the claims upon which the work
is not performed must have a "common right" in, or "legal
relationship" to, the work performed in order to satisfy
the community of interest requirement. The community of
interests must be in the work itself; merely grouping the
claims together for the purpose of performing the work,
intending that it apply to claims or groups in different
ownerships, may not satisfy the statutory requirement that
the claims be "held" in common.
In Hawgood v. Emery," a co-tenant in Claim A attempted unsuccessfully to credit that claim with work done
by him on the adjoining Claim B which he owned individually. The co-tenant actually performed the work on Claim
B, but the court refused to apply that work toward the assess99. Hawgood v. Emery, 22 S.D. 573, 119 N.W. 177 (1909).
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ment work requirement for Claim A, holding that the requisite community of interest could only be established by
an "agreement" between the two co-tenants in Claim A.
Since the non-working co-tenant in Claim A held no interest
in Claim B, and there was no agreement between the cotenants regarding the work, the non-working co-tenant had
no legal relationship to the work performed on Claim B,
which defeated the attempt to perform group assessment
work.' 0 The court strongly inferred that any such agreement should provide for the sharing of the costs of the work
performed.
While some sort of agreement between the owners of
the claims within the group must be proven to establish a
community of interest in the work, it need not be in writing.
A parol agreement among the locators of numerous claims
has been held to suffice if it provides that all of the claims
within the group should be owned by all of the locators.'
Moreover, the requisite community of interest was shown
where one group of claims was owned by a corporation and
a second group was owned individually by the president of
and the principal stockholder in that corporation.' 2
Few problems should arise regarding the community
of interest requirement under the typical arrangements
presently used in the mining industry. The cases indicate
that the community of interest requirement is satisfied if
there exists an ownership interest, or the right to obtain
an ownership interest, in the claims to which the work per100. "[W]here there are several claims adjacent held by different persons and
work beneficial to all of said claims can best be done on one of them, then,
under a proper agreement between the owners of said claims, development
work can all be done on one claim, and be credited to several claims, such
work being a part of the general plan or scheme for the development of
the several claims." Id. at 178.
101. Eberle v. Carmichael, 8 N.M. 169, 42 P. 95 (1895).
102. Karnes v. Flint, 153 Wash. 225, 279 P. 728 (1929). While the Court quoted
Hawgood v. Emery with approval, there is no express finding of an agreement between the corporation and its president; nor is there any specific
statement regarding the situs of the work performed. It appears that
the individual either performed or paid for the work himself. Thus, his
fiduciary relationship to the corporation, or the fact that the corporation
was his alter ego, could support a finding that the corporation had a legal
relationship to the work. Under the rule of Hawgood, however, had the
corporation performed or paid for the work it seems that the individual
would have had to enter into a cost-sharing or other arrangement with
the corporation to establish a community of interest.
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formed is to be applied, together with some sort of verifiable
agreement with the other owner or owners of claims within
the group which governs or permits a plan of common
development. This agreement should delegate responsibilities
for the work to be performed and provide for the sharing
of costs.
3. Benefit Requirement
The most important criterion which must be satisfied
to properly conduct group assessment work is that which
requires a demonstrable relationship between the work which
is performed and the development of each of the claims
within the group." 3
The Supreme Court most succinctly addressed the benefit requirement as it pertains to claims "held in common"
in Jackson v. Roby.' There, the senior locator attempted
to apply the group assessment work doctrine to three adjoining claims, arguing that the construction of a flume by
means of which the tailings from one of the claims were
carried and deposited on another of the claims satisfied the
statutory requirement for each claim during the assessment
year in question. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Field
ruled that such work was insufficient to maintain the claim
upon which the tailings were deposited: "In such case the
work or expenditure must be for the purpose of developing
all the claims. It does not mean that all the expenditure upon
one claim-which has no reference to the development of the
others-will answer."1 He went on to state that the group
assessment work doctrine does not apply where expenditures
are made for the development of one or a few of the claims
within the group, without reference to the development of
the others. "In other words, the law permits a general system
to be adopted for adjoining claims held in common, and in
103. This important requirement has been the topic, or the major concern of,
several Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute proceedings. E.g. Payne,
Compliance with Group Assessment Requirements, 7 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 515 (1961), and Assessment Work Manual (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
FNDN. 1971), Chapter 3. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve
deeply into the subject, which truly justifies singular treatment.
104. Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440 (1883).

105. Id. at 444.
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such cases the expenditures required may be made or the
labor be performed upon any one of them."'0 6
Since the explanation of this doctrine by Mr. Justice
Field, it has remained the law that group assessment work
must be done in furtherance of a general plan, system, or
scheme of development which tends to benefit and facilitate
the extraction of ore from each claim in the group. 0 7 One
claiming the benefit of group assessment work has wide
latitude in the exercise of professional judgment as to where
and how the work shall be performed in order to best develop
all of the claims." 8 But the work performed must be intended
in good faith to benefit all of the claims within the group,
and it must, in fact, have at least some tendency to benefit
or develop all of the claims.' 019 In sum, the purpose for which
the work is done should be premeditated and must be manifested by a tangible relation to each claim.
Rather than detailing the infinite variety of group
assessment work which has been subjected to the benefit
analysis in the case law, 1 it is more practical for purposes
of the present analysis to discuss the general development
plan or scheme upon which one must ultimately rely if
called upon to defend annual labor that is claimed as group
assessment work. First, it is not necessary that the system
or plan or scheme of development be reduced to writing,
include exact specifications, or be adopted in advance of
106. Id. at 445. Accord, Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350, 354 (1884):
"One general system may be formed well adapted and intended to work
several contiguous claims or lodes, and where such is the case work in
furtherance of the system is work on the claims intended to be developed."
Quoting, Mount Diablo Min. & Mill. Co. v. Callison, 17 Fed. Cas. 918 (No.
9,886), 5 Sawyer 439 (C.C.D. Nev. 1879).
107. E.g. Hartman Gold Min. Co. v. Warning, 42 Ariz. 267, 11 P.2d 854 (1932);
Big Three Min. & Mill. Co. v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 107 P. 301 (1909);
Morgan v. Meyers, 159 Cal. 187, 113 P. 153 (1911); Copper Mountain Min.
& Smelting Co. v. Butte & Corbin Consolidated Copper & Silver Min. Co.,
39 Mont. 487, 104 P. (1909); and Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite
Products Co., 64 Wyo. 269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948).
108. Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines Co., 43 Nev. 61, 184 P. 921 (1919);
Kramer v. Taylor, 200 Ore. 640, 266 P.2d 709 (1954).
109. Big Three Min. & Mill. Co. v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 107 P. 301 (1909);
Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines, Co., supra note 108.
L10. Whether the work performed tends to benefit or develop each claim in the
group is a question of fact, which can only be decided on the concrete
evidence in each case. Altoona Quicksilver Min. Co. v. Integral Quicksilver
Min. Co., 114 Cal. 100, 45 P. 1047 (1896); Big Three Min. & Mill. Co. v.
Hamilton, supra note 109; Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines Co., supra
note 108; Kramer v. Taylor, supra note 108.
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performing the work.11' Great reliance should not, however,
be placed upon the notion that a preconceived, written, and
specific plan is unnecessary. The larger the group, the more
necessary such a plan becomes. Without benefit of a development plan, the owner of a large group of unpatented mining
claims might be hard-pressed to justify the necessity of
maintaining such a large holding or to show how the work
performed directly facilitates the extraction of ore from
claims not closely associated with those on which the work
was performed. A preconceived and well-documented plan
of development is the best evidence of the intent to develop
the entire prospect as a logically integrated mining property.
Under present circumstances, where competition is intense and prospectors are more and more inclined to question whether those claiming large groups of mining locations
have complied with the law, anyone contemplating group
assessment work on a large block or group of mining claims
is best advised to develop plans and specifications in advance
of performing assessment work which is intended to apply
to claims on a group basis. A general plan, formulated in
advance, is far preferable to relying on post-hoc rationalization. Although a court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the considered expertise of the miner, it cannot be
overemphasized that the feasibility of any plan of operation
must be readily apparent. Benefit will not be presumed; it
must be demonstrated as a fact.
4. "Requirement" of Contiguity
"Contiguous," as used in the case law, the regulations,
and in this discussion, is given its dictionary meaning,
referring to claims that touch each other along part or all
of at least one side."' Unlike the benefit requirement, the
requirement of contiguity is not necessarily an absolute
requirement, although some cases certainly suggest that this
111. Nevada Exploration & Min. Co. v. Spriggs, 41 Utah 171, 124 P. 770 (1912).
112. See also Hidden Treasure Consolidated Quartz Mine, 35 L.D. 485 (1907);
and Anvil Hydraulic & Drainage Co. v. Code, 182 Fed. 205 (9th Cir. 1910).
Cf. Henry Petz, et al., 62 I.D. 33 (1955), regarding the definition of contiguous with respect to the preference right regarding contiguous lands
granted to holders of grazing leases.
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is so. The requirement of contiguity was first clearly stated
in Chambers v. Harrington."' Relying on a Nevada Circuit
Court decision," 4 the court stated, "It is equally clear that
in such case the claims must be contiguous so that each
claim thus associated may in some way be benefited by the
work done on one of them." 5 The court assumed that the
benefit and contiguity requirements are inextricably interrelated: work performed upon one of a group of claims (or
off the claims) for the benefit of all of them is irrebuttably
presumed to be of no benefit to those claims which are not
contiguous to those on which, or for which, the work is performed.
It is only natural for other courts to follow the language
in Supreme Court opinions, even if dictum, and soon the
1 6
contiguity requirement appeared in a number of cases.
Even Judge Lindley approved the rule that the claims must
be contiguous so that each claim thus associated may in some
way be benefited."' The contiguity requirement may still
be found in Interior Department regulations,"18 which state,
"Where a number of contiguous claims are held in common,
the aggregate expenditure that would be necessary to hold
all the claims may be made on any one claim. Cornering
locations are held not to be contiguous." Thus, the Interior
Department, like the Supreme Court and Judge Lindley,
interpret the contiguity requirement to be absolute.
Analysis of the cases, and the assumptions which first
gave rise to the contiguity requirement, clearly demonstrate
that the requirement, far from being absolute, is instead
113. Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350 (1884).
114. Mount Diablo Min. & Mill. Co. v. Callison, 17 Fed. Cas. 918 (No. 9,886)
(C.C.D. Nev. 1879), in which Judge Sawyer stated: "One general system
may be formed well adapted and intended to work several contiguous
claims or lodes, and when such is the case, work in furtherance of the
system is work on the claims intended to be developed by it." Cited in
Chambers v. Harrington, supra note 113, at 353.
115. Chambers v. Harrington, supra note 113, at 353.
116. Royston v. Miller, 76 Fed. 50 (C.C.D. Nev. 1896); Anvil Hydraulic &
Drainage Co. v. Code, 182 Fed. 205 (9th Cir. 1910); Morgan v. Meyers,
159 Cal. 187, 113 P. 153 (1911); and Kramer v. Taylor, 200 Ore. 640, 266
P.2d 709 (1954). See also Hidden Treasure Consolidated Quartz Mine, 35
L.D. 485 (1907); Copper Glance Lode, 29 L.D. 542 (1900); Gird v. California Oil Co., 60 Fed. 531 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1894).
117. 2 LINDLEY ON MINES § 630 (3rd Ed. 1914).
118. 43 C.F.R. § 3851.1 (1979).
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illogical. First, all the reported cases which state that contiguity is an absolute requirement were decided on issues
other than contiguity; i.e., the requirement, when apparently
imposed, has always been dictum. Second, the assumption
that contiguity is required in order for the work to benefit
each claim is plainly illogical since the law allows even work
performed entirely outside of the group of claims (such as
building roads to the claims) to apply as group assessment
work sufficient to maintain those claims under 30 U.S.C.
§ 28.
All of the cases can be reconciled with the thought that
contiguity is not an absolute requirement when it is accepted
that benefit is the important test. Noncontiguity will, of
course, render it more difficult to prove benefit to the claims
for which the work purports to be apportioned when those
claims are separated from the claims upon which the work
is actually performed. The further the distance, the greater
the difficulty in demonstrating the benefit. Numerous courts
have, notwithstanding the dicta discussed above, ruled, properly and reasonably, that contiguity is not an absolute
requirement.
Perhaps the most accurate and best discussion of the
law regarding the contiguity "requirement" appears in the
case of Hain v. Mattes."' There, work was performed in a
tunnel which, when extended, would eventually reach the
claim that was the subject of the lawsuit. The owner claimed
that the tunnel was driven with the intention of developing
the claim in question as well as 31 other claims within the
group and that the tunnel would eventually reach the claim
in question. The jury was instructed on the benefit requirement and further instructed that contiguity was not necessary in order for the work to apply as assessment work and
prevent the claimed forfeiture. The relocator appealed that
instruction. The court approved the instruction, but relied
on the 1875 amendment to 30 U.S.C. § 28 to distinguish
Chambers v. Harringtonand the other cases requiring con345, Scholarship,
83 P. 127 (1905).
v. Mattes,
119. Hain
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tiguity.1 ° The Court properly ruled that "the true test to
be applied is, does the work benefit or tend to benefit the
claim, and was it done for the purpose of developing the
claim?"11 The court reasoned persuasively that if work
performed outside of the boundaries of a claim, such as the
construction of a wagon road, or at a distance from the
claim or upon a patented claim may be held to comply with
the annual assessment work requirement, work done in a
tunnel for developing a claim may be also applied as annual
assessment work regardless of the contiguity or noncontiguity of the territory from the portal of the tunnel to the
claim alleged to be benefited. Noncontiguity, therefore, is
important only insofar as it may have a bearing on the
ultimate question of whether the work does or does not tend
to develop the claim in question.
Despite this reasoning, in view of the fact that the
Interior Department regulation still requires contiguity in
order for assessment work to apply to each claim in the
group, it is by far the safest course to only apply group
assessment work practices in conformity with the contiguity
requirement. This is especially the case since it is now at
least implied that the government could contest mining
claims on the ground that annual assessment work was not
performed or was improperly performed. 12 If one seeks to
apply assessment work to noncontiguous claims he should
be strongly of the opinion that the work done on one of
two or more groups of claims clearly satisfies the benefit
test. If the benefit test can be established, a senior locator
should be protected against rival locators who would attempt
to assert title solely on the basis that the contiguity requirement was not satisfied.
120. On February 11, 1875, Congress amended Section 5 of the General Mining
Law of 1872 (18 Stat. at 315) to provide that a person may run a tunnel
for the purpose of developing lode or lodes owned by it and that the money
so expended will be considered as expended upon such lode or lodes.
121. Hain v. Mattes, supra note 119, at 350, 83 P. at 130.
122. See Assessment Work Manual (ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FNDN. 1971), Introduction and Chapter One, regarding Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48
(1970).
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CONCLUSION

Like the federal government and the legal profession,
the hardrock minerals exploration industry has grown and
changed over the last century to a point never contemplated
or even imagined by its earliest participants. Changing economics of mineral development and new technologies that
permit the recovery of large, often low-grade, mineral deposits have radically changed the very nature of hardrock
mineral development. The increasing pace of these changes
puts considerable pressure on the limitations first conceived
by those earliest participants and then codified in the General
Mining Law.
To date, the General Mining Law has served the industry well and the courts have generally afforded adequate
protection for the time and money invested. Nevertheless,
today's hardrock miners find less public land available to
them. They also have a need for larger areas to render lowgrade deposits economically mineable, and they ply their
trade under increasing governmental and public scrutiny.
All of this, plus heightened competition within the industry,
increases the pressure to break down existing barriers, both
legal and equitable. As a result, it is more and more difficult
to acquire and then keep a strategic land position consisting
of unpatented mining claims.
Some locators are showing an increased tendency to try
to extend the General Mining Law to (or beyond) its limits,
and junior locators are more willing than ever to challenge
senior locations which have not been perfected by a discovery.
When the needs of the industry run hard up against the
barriers of existing law, something must give. Usually, but
not always, it is the industry rather than the law. Even so,
temporary breakthroughs in the barriers imposed by the law
may quickly close; the Geomet case is just one example. The
wisest course today may simply be to take advantage of the
surest protections the law provides. The greatest anodyne
to modern headaches suffered in the industry is provided
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by making discoveries on unpatented mining claims. When
this is not possible, there is no better protection than total
preparation based upon adequate knowledge of the limitations within which the miner must work.
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